Qualifying Qualified Immunity by Williams, John C.
Vanderbilt Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an
authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
John C. Williams, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 Vanderbilt Law Review 1295 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol65/iss4/4
Qualifying Qualified Immunity
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1295
II. HISTORY OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ........................................ 1298
A . B irth of a D octrine ........................................................ 1299
B. Harlow v. Fitzgerald and the Ascendance
of the Objective Standard ........................................... 1302
C. Defining "Clearly Established" ................................. 1304
1. Specificity of the Right ................................... 1305
2. Sources of Law .................................................. 1309
3. W hen Laws Collide .......................................... 1312
D. Saucier and Its Demise ............................................... 1314
III. WEISE V. CASPER AND THE FLAWS OF THE DOCTRINE ........ 1318
A . The C ase ......................................................................... 1318
B . The Controversy ............................................................ 1323
IV. QUALIFYING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ........................................ 1327
A. A Modified Return to the "Rigid Order of
B attle" ........................................... ................................. 1327
B. Clarifying the Breadth of the Right .......................... 1330
C. Different Standards for Different Actors
and R ights ...................................................................... 1330
D. Determining Sources of Law ...................................... 1333
V . C ONCLUSION ............................................................................... 1335
I. INTRODUCTION
I remember well one of my first assignments as a fledgling
journalist at an Arkansas newspaper: "Do you want to go hear the
President speak tonight?" asked my editor. The answer, of course, was
yes-no matter that this was 2007 and Bill Clinton was no longer in
the White House. The prospect of attending the speech stimulated
feelings of engagement with politics, with current affairs, with the
nation as a whole.
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I imagine Leslie Weise and Alex Young had similar feelings
when, in 2005, they attended a government-funded speech by
President George W. Bush in Denver.1 But those feelings appear to
have been mixed with ones of discontent and dissent toward the
President-for the pair arrived in a car with a bumper sticker reading
"No More Blood for Oil," an obvious jab at Bush's Iraq War policies. 2
On instructions from the White House Advance Office, a volunteer
named Michael Casper approached Weise and Young at their seats
and ejected them from the event.3 The Secret Service later told Weise
and Young that they were forced to leave because of the bumper
sticker.4
Those who are not legally trained (and many of those who are)
surely will feel viscerally ill at ease with this situation. There is no
glossing or spinning the facts: because Weise and Young expressed a
view contrary to the President's, they were ejected from his speech
and atomized from the spectators whose attendance the White House
Advance Office deemed permissible. A crucial thread in our national
fabric is the right to dissent, within the bounds of reason, without
retaliation for the viewpoint expressed. It would seem obvious that the
government overstepped its authority by preventing Weise and Young
from hearing the President speak.
Yet, a remedy has not been forthcoming, precisely because the
Tenth Circuit found that it was not obvious that the government
violated Weise's and Young's First Amendment rights by ejecting
them from a public speech for the views expressed on the bumper
sticker.5 The court's exact holding was that the district court properly
dismissed the duo's Bivens suit 6 against Casper and other individuals
who ejected them on the ground of qualified immunity. As discussed in
further detail below, a government agent sued in his individual
capacity has qualified immunity from suit if his action did not violate
the plaintiffs constitutional right at all or if he violated a right that
1. Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010).
2. Id. at 1065.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1070.
6. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971), held that there is a cause of action against individual federal officials for damages when
their actions amount to a violation of constitutional rights.
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was not "clearly established" at the time. 7 Weise and Young lost on the
latter prong.8
There is something dysfunctional about a legal doctrine that
dismisses a suit with these facts because the right claimed was not
"clearly established." Though the doctrine of qualified immunity
serves the important purpose of ensuring that government agents may
exercise discretion without fear of a lawsuit, it should not serve this
purpose at the expense of leaving people such as Weise and Young
without a remedy. Moreover, current qualified immunity doctrine
threatens to sacrifice adequate development of the law. In a recent
article, Dahlia Lithwick wondered why the War on Terror has not
produced an important First Amendment case. 9 The Supreme Court
has heard First Amendment petitions about crush videos and violent
video games, so why not more substantial issues such as the rights of
Leslie Weise and Alex Young to silently protest the Iraq War? One
possible answer is that, in the years since the Vietnam era, when it
recognized Paul Cohen's right to wear a jacket reading "Fuck the
Draft,"'10 the Court has developed a qualified immunity jurisprudence
that is overly restrictive in scope.
This Note examines how the Court could modify the doctrine of
qualified immunity to ensure adequate protection of individual rights
and sufficient development of constitutional law. Part II discusses and
analyzes the history of the qualified immunity doctrine. In particular,
it explores how rationales the Supreme Court used in earlier
articulations of the doctrine might be recovered and used to liberalize
qualified immunity. Part III analyzes Weise v. Casper as a particular
application of qualified immunity doctrine. Though the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in 2010,11 a close reading of the case illustrates
the defects of the contemporary qualified immunity inquiry and
provides a springboard for developing a more nuanced vision of the
doctrine. To this end, Part IV suggests several ways in which qualified
immunity might be beneficially modified. Specifically, the Court
should consider how its rationales for granting qualified immunity
might differ depending on the right at issue and the state actor
7. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
8. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1170.
9. Dahlia Lithwick, Why Hasn't the War Against Terrorism Produced Any Great First
Amendment Cases?, SLATE, Nov. 26, 2010, httpJ/www.slate.con/id/2276010/.
10. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
11. Weise v. Casper, 131 S. Ct. 7 (2010).
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involved. The Court should also better define what it means for a right
to be "clearly established," both in terms of how broadly a clearly
established right is to be construed and in terms of what sources of
law courts may use to evaluate the existence of rights. For example,
the Court might implement a burden-shifting scheme requiring a
defendant to match a plaintiffs showing of relevant case law. This and
other reforms would help prevent defendants from dismissing
nonfrivolous lawsuits based on their claimed ignorance of
constitutional law. Finally, the Court should assess the cost of its
recent decision to allow lower courts discretion in how they order the
two prongs of the qualified immunity inquiry. Addressing the
constitutional question first will in many cases allow for more robust
constitutional jurisprudence.
II. HISTORY OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In its current state, qualified immunity is a two-step inquiry: a
court will dismiss a defendant from the suit if she did not violate the
plaintiffs constitutional right or if the constitutional right she did in
fact violate was not clearly established at the time of the violation.
This has not always been the test. Since Bivens was decided in 1971,
the qualified immunity doctrine has developed so as to increasingly
shield defendants from discovery and trial. First, the Supreme Court
has abandoned an inquiry into the defendant's subjective motives in
favor of an objective test that asks whether the defendant should have
known that her action violated the plaintiffs rights. 12 Second, it has
incorporated into its qualified immunity doctrine a mistake-of-fact
defense: if the defendant violated the plaintiff's rights but did so based
on a reasonable mistake, she is immune from suit.13 Third, it has
declined to tailor the qualified immunity defense to the specific
constitutional violation alleged or to the level of discretion required of
the defendant acting in her official capacity. 14
To compound these problems-problems, that is, from the
plaintiffs perspective-the Supreme Court has never given a fully
cogent definition of what it means for a right to be "clearly
12. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (1982).
13. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987).
14. Id. at 643.
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established."1 5 The result is an expansion of subjective judicial
discretion and a decrease in the overall uniformity of qualified
immunity rulings. 16 A right that is clearly established in one
jurisdiction may not be so in another, and judges within the same
jurisdiction may disagree as to the clarity of a right. The failure to
firmly define how judges should determine which rights are "clearly
established" benefits defendants, who may cast doubt on the clarity of
a right by pointing to contrary authority in other jurisdictions.
Finally, qualified immunity provides a defense only to claims
for damages, and not to claims for injunctive relief.17 Yet, because of
the two-part qualified immunity inquiry, a plaintiff may "lose" the
suit-that is, receive no monetary recovery-and still have her
ultimate right vindicated by the court. Though a ruling that the
defendant violated her right may not put cash in the plaintiffs pocket,
it sends a message to government actors and sets boundaries for
future behavior. However, this function of the qualified immunity
doctrine may become less relevant after Pearson v. Callahan,18 a
recent case that allows judges to answer the clarity question without
reaching the constitutional issue.
This Part traces these doctrinal developments before
addressing their consequences in the context of the Weise case.
A. Birth of a Doctrine
The qualified immunity doctrine had its genesis in two cases:
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 19 which sought to hold Ohio's governor accountable
for his misuse of the National Guard, and Wood v. Strickland,20 which
involved a suit against school officials after they disciplined the
plaintiffs. The Court's underlying challenge in these cases was to
15. See The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 272, 278 (2009) '[W]ith
respect to qualified immunity, the Court simply has not articulated a definitive standard for the
lower courts to apply.").
16. Id. at 281.
17. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 546 (5th ed. 2007).
18. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
19. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). Though Scheuer was a § 1983 suit against state executives, the
same principles of qualified immunity were applied to most federal officers subject to Bivens
suits in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978). However, Butz allowed absolute immunity
for executive officials who performed judicial and prosecutorial functions-functions that
traditionally require a high level of discretion. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), later
granted absolute immunity to the President.
20. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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define the sort of "qualified" immunity that would protect both
individual constitutional rights and officials' need to exercise
discretion without fear of punishment. From the beginning, the Court
recognized the importance of protecting government officials from suit
for actions they took in their official capacities. Scheuer, for example,
found that the doctrine was rooted in the need to protect officials who
are legally required to use discretion.21 Subjecting officials to suit for
their behavior on the job might deter full and effective use of that
discretion. 22 However, the Court also acknowledged that damages
against individuals are sometimes the only remedy for constitutional
wrongs. 23 To give government officials absolute immunity from suit
would be to deny a remedy for such wrongs. 24 In balancing officials'
need for discretion against enforcement of individual rights, Scheuer
and Wood each employed a combination of subjective and objective
factors-although, as discussed below, the cases do not totally agree.
Scheuer involved a suit against the Governor of Ohio and other
state officials for their role in employing the National Guard during
the 1970 Kent State massacre. In rejecting absolute immunity and
defining a standard of qualified immunity, the Court paid particular
attention to the level of discretion exercised by different types of
officials. The Court reasoned that the strictures of good faith and
probable cause limited and defined a police officer's discretion.25
Governors and other higher officials, on the other hand, more
frequently make split-second decisions and face a "virtually infinite"
range of choices in their daily activities. 26 The Court did not attempt
to outline a precise definition of the qualified immunity standard to
apply to state governors.27 Rather, it laid out two principles of
qualified immunity. First, the level of immunity depends on the
amount of discretion afforded the individual in his official capacity:
"[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the
executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon
the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the
21. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 239-40.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 238.
24. Put in somewhat more theoretical terms, the individual officer might be considered
stripped of his official role-and thus of his official immunity-when he offends the higher power
of the Constitution. Id. at 237 (citing Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
25. Id. at 245.
26. Id. at 246.
27. Id. at 249.
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circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time."28 Second,
whether qualified immunity is a successful defense depends upon the
officer's subjective intentions as well as objective factors: "It is the
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and
in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that
affords a basis for qualified immunity."29 The Court remanded the
case for further examination of the record, thereby implying that when
a defendant asserts qualified immunity, a court must find at least
some facts before dismissing the suit upon that basis.30
Though Scheuer was a unanimous decision, the Court split 5-4
when it further developed Scheuer's holding in Wood. Wood involved
public school students' claims of due process violations after school
officials suspended them for that most classic of schoolhouse pranks-
spiking the punch.31 In Wood, the Court reemphasized that the
question of qualified immunity contains both subjective and objective
elements.32 An official would not be immune if the plaintiff could show
one of two things: "[I]f the [defendant] knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff]
affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause
a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the
[plaintiff]." 33 In an important distinction from Scheuer, the Court
stated that the objective prong focused not on an official's
responsibility to make a reasonable judgment based on surrounding
circumstances, but rather on an official's responsibility to know and
act within the constitutional rights of the students she serves. 34 In
other words, the Court charged government officials with knowledge
of the law. The dissent, by Justice Powell, replied that this standard
28. Id. at 247.
29. Id. at 247-48.
30. Id. at 249-50. This implication is in stark contrast to the Court's later use of qualified
immunity to dismiss suits as quickly as possible. &e, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200
(2001) ("Where the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made
early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is
dispositive.').
31. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 311 (1975).
32. Id. at 321.
33. Id. at 322. Though the Wood majority explicitly limited its holding to school
administrators, it subsequently applied the same subjective/objective test to other government
officials. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 n.25 (noting subsequent cases in which the
Wood standard for qualified immunity was used).
34. Wood, 420 U.S. at 322.
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was significantly stricter than the one established in Scheuer,
precisely because it hinged liability on an official's objective ignorance
of constitutional law rather than on the reasonableness of her actions
in light of the circumstances known to her.35
B. Harlow v. Fitzgerald and the Ascendance of the Objective Standard
Only seven years later, Justice Powell wrote the majority
opinion in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,36 eliminating the subjective element
of qualified immunity in favor of the same sort of objective test he
decried in his Wood dissent. The defendants in Harlow were personal
aides to President Richard Nixon; the plaintiff alleged that the aides
conspired to fire him from his Air Force position in retaliation for his
congressional testimony about the mismanagement of plane
purchases.37 The Court first rejected the defendants' argument that
they were entitled to absolute immunity. The Court suggested that
absolute immunity might be appropriate for a presidential aide who
had "discretionary authority in such sensitive areas as national
security or foreign policy," but not in the case of these particular
aides.38 The Court then went on to announce a new standard for
qualified immunity stripped of the subjective prong: "[G]overnment
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."39 The Court also provided the
defendants with a second way out of the suit: "If the official pleading
the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he
neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard,
the defense should be sustained."40
35. Id. at 330 (Powell, J., dissenting). By granting officials qualified immunity if their
behavior was factually reasonable, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987), essentially
incorporated Justice Powell's critique into the Court's qualified immunity doctrine.
36. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
37. The full facts are given in a companion case, Nixon v. Rtzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 733-34
(1982).
38. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 812. The Court's reasoning on this point conformed to its "varying
scope" analysis in Scheuer: the greater the need for official discretion, the greater the need for
official immunity while exercising that discretion. See id. at 811-12 ("This form of argument
accords with the analytical approach of our cases.").
39. Id. at 818.
40. Id. at 819.
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Why this about-face? The Court's reasoning provides some
clues as to why it suddenly found the subjective prong of the test
problematic. Contrary to Scheuer and Wood, which emphasized the
need to hold government officials accountable when they violate
constitutional rights, Harlow emphasized a different purpose for the
qualified immunity doctrine: the need to dismiss "insubstantial
lawsuits" that come at a "cost not only to defendant officials, but to
society as a whole."41 Employing the sort of cost-benefit balancing
common to the Court's jurisprudence of this era,42 the Court found a
particularly high cost to inquiring into the subjective intent of
officials. As the Court saw it, the question of an official's intent is one
of fact; because questions of fact require a jury verdict, consideration
of intent must await completion of the summary judgment phase.43
Any court that inquired into subjective motivation would have to
conduct broad discovery to unearth sufficient facts to make a
decision.44 Not only would such a process distract officials from doing
their real jobs; it might also require the disclosure of traditionally
protected information, and it could be manipulated by plaintiffs able
to create material issues of fact out of small bits of evidence .45 In his
concurrence, Justice Brennan stated that qualified immunity analysis
still required some discovery as to the defendant's knowledge of the
law.46 If the defendant actually knew he was violating the plaintiff's
right, then it would be irrelevant whether it was reasonable for him to
know that he was violating the right. 47
Harlow made it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring allegations
of constitutional violations to trial.48 An inquiry into an officer's intent
necessarily requires more factual discovery than an objective
examination into the current state of the law. Harlow's language
suggested that plaintiffs may not conduct this discovery. 49 And,
41. Id. at 814.
42. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984) (weighing the costs and
benefits of the exclusionary rule to create the reasonable good faith exception).
43. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.
44. Id. at 817.
45. Id. at 817 n.29 (quoting Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
46. Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring).
47. Id.
48. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 548 ("The Court's concern was more with
protecting officers from the additional cost of defending essentially meritless suits than with
ensuring that injured individuals receive compensation for the wrongs they have suffered.").
49. In actual fact, the Court has never foreclosed discovery altogether where the defendant
claims qualified immunity. Though it has stressed that "qualified immunity questions should be
2012] 1303
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Justice Brennan's concurrence notwithstanding, the opinion implied
that an officer could act in bad faith so long as the right claimed was
not clearly established.
Regardless of how one views Harlow's impact on the plaintiff-
defendant balance, the case presented several other problems. As
Justice Powell indicated in his Wood dissent, it is difficult to define
the nature of a clearly established law.50 How was the Court to
conduct its objective legal reasonableness test? Moreover, as Justice
Brennan predicted in his Harlow concurrence, eliminating the
subjective prong did not eliminate the need to conduct factual
discovery before an immunity ruling. 51
C. Defini'ng "Clearly Established"
Harlow's "clearly established" prong has presented at least
three difficulties for courts attempting to apply it. First, how general
or specific is the right that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated?
For example, should a court examine whether it is clearly established
that a government official may not use deadly force in most
circumstances, or is the inquiry, rather, whether it was clearly
established that it was impermissible to use deadly force in the
particular way the defendant used it? The Court has almost always
resolved at the earliest possible stage of a litigation," Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646
n.6 (1987), where the complaint pleads facts sufficient to state a clearly established
constitutional violation, immediate dismissal on the ground of qualified immunity is
inappropriate. Where there is a fact dispute, for example, discovery tailored to the question of
qualified immunity will be warranted. See id. (stating that on remand limited discovery would be
required if the parties disagreed as to the defendant's actions); see also Johnson v. Jones, 515
U.S. 304, 313 (1995) (holding that a defendant may not immediately appeal denial of summary
judgment for lack of qualified immunity where the denial is based on an outstanding fact issue).
Discovery will often be required where the plaintiffs substantive claim requires a showing of the
defendant's state of mind. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-601 (1998) (describing
discovery procedures district courts may follow when a defendant asserts qualified immunity in
response to a claim requiring a showing of intent). Discovery may even be necessary to show that
the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity in the first place. For example, in Weise it was
initially unclear whether several defendants could be treated as government actors for the
purpose of qualified immunity. Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 2007).
50. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 329 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) ('One need only
look to the decisions of this Court-to our reversals, our recognition of evolving concepts, and our
five-to-four splits-to recognize the hazard of even informed prophecy as to what are
'unquestioned constitutional rights.' ").
51. For an older discussion of how courts dealt with the problem of discovery after Harlow,
see Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA.
L. REV. 597, 642-61 (1989).
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required specificity. However, its edicts on this point have sometimes
been contradictory and have ignored the problem of factual discovery
that Harlow purported to solve. Second, what sources of law should a
court examine to discern the clarity of the right? The Supreme Court
has been especially obscure on this question. Consequently, the
federal courts of appeal take divergent approaches to the issue.
5 2
Finally, is it ever possible for a right to be clearly established if courts
have issued conflicting opinions on the matter?
1. Specificity of the Right
How specific must the plaintiff's claim be to state a clearly
established right? The Court spoke most clearly on this question in
Anderson v. Creighton,53 a suit against a police officer for a Fourth
Amendment violation. The officer searched the plaintiff's house,
without a warrant, on the mistaken belief that a bank robber was
there. The Court held that the question was not whether the law was
sufficiently clear that it is illegal to conduct a warrantless search of a
house absent probable cause and exigent circumstances.5 4 Rather, the
question was whether the defendant could have believed probable
cause and exigent circumstances to be present considering the facts
known to him at the time. 55 Like Harlow, Anderson expressed distrust
of plaintiffs bringing "insubstantial claims": "A passably clever
plaintiff would always be able to identify an abstract clearly
established right that the defendant could be alleged to have
violated ... ."56 In dissent, three Justices argued that the Court had
established a "double standard of reasonableness": an officer who
violated the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard might
nevertheless be dismissed as a defendant because he made a
reasonable factual mistake. 57
Anderson advanced Harlow's march toward the defendant's
side of the aisle, but it did so with much greater clarity. For the first
52. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
53. 483 U.S. 635.
54. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), held that it is unconstitutional for officers to
search a house without a warrant unless there are exigent circumstances.
55. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41 ("It simply does not follow immediately from the
conclusion that it was firmly established that warrantless searches not supported by probable
cause and exigent circumstances violate the Fourth Amendment that Anderson's search was
objectively legally unreasonable.').
56. Id. at 640 n.2.
57. Id. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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time, the Court flatly rejected the suggestion in Scheuer that the scope
of immunity depends on the discretion of the officer. Indeed, as the
Anderson dissent would have ruled, the Scheuer Court explicitly
equated immunity with Fourth Amendment requirements of good
faith and probable cause.58 Now, however, the Court thought
otherwise: "[W]e have been unwilling to complicate qualified
immunity analysis by making the scope or extent of immunity turn on
the precise nature of various officials' duties or the precise character of
the particular rights alleged to have been violated."5 9
Both the dissent and the majority claimed Harlow's mantle.
The dissent emphasized that Harlow's policy concerns were twofold: to
allow officers to perform their jobs without fear of suit and to avoid
making officers prophets of developments in constitutional law. 60 But
those rationales did not allow courts to dismiss defendants from
lawsuits where, from an ex post perspective, they violated clearly
established law. In this case, the defendant could still make a claim
that he subjectively believed there to be exigent circumstances and
probable cause at the time of arrest; but that claim was one properly
considered by a jury.61 The majority, on the other hand, emphasized
that its rule was consistent with the "objective legal reasonableness"
of Harlow.62 The primary concern was not whether the officer knew
the law, but whether the officer knew that what he was doing violated
the law. 63
Ultimately, Anderson has two flaws--one concerning facts and
one concerning law. Under the Anderson approach, the defendant may
plead facts in his affirmative immunity defense. Yet, the plaintiff is
generally not in a position to dispute these facts. The Court must
judge the reasonableness of the defendant's action without affording
the plaintiff an opportunity to inquire into the truth of the defendant's
claims. This situation creates an obvious imbalance in favor of
defendants. Specifically, it creates the risk that a defendant will avoid
58. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 245 (1974) ("When a court evaluates police conduct
relating to an arrest its guideline is 'good faith and probable cause.' In the case of higher officers
of the executive branch, however, the inquiry is far more complex since the range of decisions
and choices... is virtually infinite." (citation omitted)).
59. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643.
60. Id. at 649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 650-53.
62. Id. at 639 (majority opinion).
63. Id. at 640 ("The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.").
[Vol. 65:4:12951306
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suit by selectively remembering-or blatantly lying about-facts that
cause his ignorance of the law to appear reasonable.64
Regarding the latter flaw, Anderson ultimately left open the
question of how specific a right must be in order to be "clearly
established." The Court asserted that its holding did not require that
"the very action in question has previously been held unlawful" in
order for the qualified immunity defense to fail; it meant only that "in
the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. 65
This statement contradicted the outcome of the case, for it was
certainly "apparent" that officers are prohibited from entering a house
without a warrant absent exigent circumstances. More importantly, it
left a gaping hole in qualified immunity law. It was not enough to
allege a general violation, but the specific action need not previously
have been held unlawful to defeat an immunity defense. What criteria
were courts to use to assess the "apparent unlawfulness" of an officer's
action?
These problems became apparent in two subsequent cases,
Hope v. Pelzer66 and Brosseau v. Haugen.67 Hope involved an Eighth
Amendment challenge to an Alabama prison's practice of handcuffing
prisoners to a "hitching post" under the blazing sun for hours at a
time. 68 The Eleventh Circuit granted the defendant prison guards
qualified immunity because no previous case had' ruled that
"materially similar" facts amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment.69 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the question
was whether the officials had "fair warning" that their actions violated
64. It is true that Anderson acknowledged the need for limited factual discovery in some
qualified immunity cases, and subsequent developments bore out the implications of this
acknowledgment. See supra note 49 (discussing discovery in qualified immunity cases). However,
discovery is in major tension with the need to end cases against government officials quickly, one
of the central purposes of the qualified immunity doctrine. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
526-27 (1985) (characterizing qualified immunity as the "right not to stand trial" and stating,
"Harlow emphasizes that even such pretrial matters as discovery are to he avoided if possible, as
'[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government' " (alteration in
original)). For one example of how courts may dismiss on the ground of qualified immunity
despite unsettled facts, see infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
65. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. The case might not have been an ideal one in which to
announce this rule. Exigent-circumstance doctrine is notoriously muddy, and it might be
plausibly argued in many cases that the existence of exigent circumstances was not clear.
66. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
67. 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
68. Hope, 536 U.S. at 733-35.
69. Id. at 736.
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the Eighth Amendment.7 0 The dissent contended that the Court
should have looked specifically to whether previous rulings held the
use of a hitching post to be an Eighth Amendment violation.
7 1
The question in Brosseau was whether the defendant police
officer violated the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights when she shot
him in the back as he fled arrest in his Jeep.7 2 Supreme Court
precedent clearly prevents the use of deadly force unless an officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect threatens physical harm to
the officer or to others.7 3 However, the Court ruled that this bare
precedent was not enough to clearly establish the right claimed.
Instead, the question was whether, given the particular factual
situation, the officer should have known that shooting the plaintiff
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 74 Finding no case that applied
the Court's excessive-force precedent to the facts at hand, the Court
dismissed the suit.7 5 It stressed in particular that Fourth Amendment
excessive-force cases are fact intensive: where the officer's actions
straddle the "hazy border between excessive and acceptable force," the
officer will have qualified immunity.76 The dissent agreed that
excessive-force cases are fact specific. It argued, however, that a jury
rather than a judge should address those facts.7 7 When defendants
raise a qualified immunity defense, the question is whether the law is
clear-not whether the courts have previously disapproved of behavior
that was factually similar to the defendants'.78
It is difficult to reconcile Hope with Brosseau. Indeed, the
Court's specific rule on deadly force offers much clearer guidance to
officials than the Eighth Amendment's general prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment. If the purpose of qualified immunity is to
excuse officers where the law was not clear, it seems that Hope offered
the better case for qualified immunity. Nevertheless, Brosseau did not
70. Id. at 741.
71. Id. at 752-53 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
72. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 194-97.
73. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
74. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 200.
75. Id. at 201.
76. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).
77. Id. at 206 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('Although it is preferable to resolve the qualified
immunity question at the earliest possible stage of litigation, this preference does not give judges
license to take inherently factual questions away from the jury.").
78. Id. at 205 ("[T]he Court's search for relevant case law applying the Garner standard to
materially similar facts is both unnecessary and ill advised.").
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even cite Hope's "fair warning" standard. It instead returned to
Anderson's equation of "clarity" with "factual similarity."
Indeed, Brosseau is an especially potent illustration of the way
the stricter Anderson inquiry favors defendants. The specific question
to be considered, the Court wrote, was whether there is a violation of
clearly established law when an officer shoots "a disturbed felon, set
on avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the
immediate area are at risk from that flight."79 This formulation makes
the assumption that there were in fact "persons in the immediate
area." However, the only indication that this was actually true was the
defendant's bare testimony-testimony that other evidence
contradicted.8 0 Hence, there remained a question of fact as to whether
the defendant really had probable cause to fear for the lives of others,
as required for the lawful use of deadly force. The Court imported this
question of fact into its legal determination of whether the defendant
violated the plaintiffs clearly established Fourth Amendment right.
When a court formulates a legal question with such factual specificity,
it is much more likely to find that the right in question is not clearly
established. The probability of finding a clearly established right will
also depend on the curiosity of the court: a court that roams broadly
through the case law is more likely to find a factual situation on point
than one that limits its search.
2. Sources of Law
If a court is required to look to the specific facts at issue in
order to determine whether a right is clearly established-apparently
the rule after Brosseau-then it is important to enumerate the sources
of law that may establish the right. However, the Supreme Court did
not perform this task in Harlow, and it has not done so in the
intervening thirty years.8' Rather, it has adopted a sort of "lead by
example" approach-that is, it has erratically turned to varying
sources of law and left it to the lower courts to determine whether
those sources are appropriate for their own cases.
79. Id. at 200.
80. Id. at 197; Haugen v. Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing fact
dispute over whether the plaintiffs actions posed a risk of harm to others).
81. See The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 15, at 278 ("[W]ith respect to




A brief survey of the post-Harlow cases demonstrates this
point.82 Wilson v. Layne83 found that there was no clearly established
Fourth Amendment protection against having reporters accompany
police into a home while executing a valid search warrant.84 After
finding that "general principles of the Fourth Amendment" did not
establish the right, the Court found that no judicial opinions held the
practice to be unlawful.8 5 The Court then suggested that the outcome
might have been different had the plaintiffs pointed to "cases of
controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident
which clearly established the rule on which they seek to rely,"8 6 or to
"a consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable
officer could not have believed that his actions were lawful."87 Thus,
after Wilson, it appeared that a court faced with a qualified immunity
challenge would conduct a two-part inquiry. First, did general
constitutional principles establish the right? Second, was there
controlling authority within the jurisdiction or other persuasive
authority that clearly established the right?
The Court has not subsequently followed this test. As discussed
above,88 the clarity of a right is fact intensive; it cannot usually be
shown by appealing to general constitutional principles. Moreover, the
Court itself has consulted a variety of law beyond jurisdictional
precedent and persuasive case authority. In Hope, the Court found a
clearly established Eighth Amendment right by looking to
jurisdictional precedent, an Alabama Department of Corrections
regulation, and a Department of Justice report on the
unconstitutionality of tying prisoners to hitching posts.8 9 In Brosseau,
the Court held that cases from multiple circuit courts did not establish
a constitutional violation.90 In Pearson v. Callahan,91 the Court found
82. Harlow itself remanded for a determination of clarity of the right without describing
sources of law the lower court must use to make that determination. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 819-20 (1982).
83. 526 U.S. 603 (1999). One commenter has called Wilson the Court's clearest
pronouncement on the issue. The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 15, at 277-78.
84. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617-18. The Court held, however, that the practice is a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 614. Thus, since 1999 it has been clearly established that
reporters may not accompany police executing a warrant into a home.
85. Id. at 615-16.
86. Id. at 617.
87. Id.
88. Supra Part II.C.1.
89. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741-42 (2002).
90. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199-201 (2004).
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no clear constitutional infirmity in a search-and-seizure theory known
as "consent-once-removed" after looking to three out-of-circuit federal
appellate decisions and two state supreme court decisions that
approved the practice. 92
The Court's lack of consistency has led the circuits to adopt
their own formulae when faced with a qualified immunity question.
Not every decision on the clearly established prong is a case-counting
game, and the circuits exhibit some inconsistency in the language they
use to describe required sources of law. But when they must count,
most circuits are rather flexible and will look to other case law if there
is no Supreme Court or circuit court opinion on point. 93 (They vary in
their assessment of how much consensus must have been reached
outside the circuit.) Though one commenter has characterized the
Sixth and D.C. Circuits' tests as more restrictive,94 these circuits will
also consider outside case law when none is available within the
jurisdiction.95 The Fourth Circuit generally looks only to the Supreme
Court, circuit precedent, and the highest court from the state in which
the case arose. 96 The Second Circuit sometimes uses language
91. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
92. Id. at 244.
93. See Schmidt v. Creedon, 639 F.3d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that the court will
look to the law of other circuits when the Third Circuit has not addressed the plaintiffs asserted
right); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that a court may look to
a robust consensus of authority, but that a right is not clearly established if there is a circuit
split); Ault v. Speicher, 634 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2011) (requiring the plaintiff to point to "case
law" articulating the right claimed and applying it to a similar factual circumstance); Coates v.
Powell, 639 F.3d 471, 476 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that the circuit "applies a flexible standard,
requiring some, but not precise factual correspondence with precedent'); Howards v.
McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1141 (10th Cir. 2011) (stating that the plaintiff must show a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or that the weight of other authority supports
her argument); Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 833 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding no Supreme
Court or Ninth Circuit case on point and looking outside the circuit); Jennings v. Jones, 499 F.3d
2, 16 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that a right is clearly established if "courts have previously ruled
that materially similar conduct was unconstitutional").
94. The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 15, at 279 & nn.83-84.
95. See Bame v. Dilliard, 637 F.3d 380, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that that court will
consider the consensus view of other circuits if there is one); O'Malley v. City of Flint, 652 F.3d
662, 667-68 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that the court will look outside the circuit if there is a lack of
other precedent) (quoting Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1336 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Walton also stated the stingier proposition that a court should look outside the circuit only in an
"extraordinary case." Walton, 995 F.2d at 1336. But few district courts and no Sixth Circuit
panel has cited the case for that proposition in the past decade.
96. See Doe v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 176 (4th Cir. 2010). However, in some
cases the Circuit has gone beyond these sources and looked to "a consensus of cases of persuasive
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indicating refusal to look outside the circuit, but this refusal is not
absolute.97 The Eleventh Circuit less equivocally declines to look
beyond the jurisdiction.98
3. When Laws Collide
When courts face conflicting sources of law, can a right ever be
clearly established? It might plausibly be argued that the answer is
"no." How can a point of law be "clear" if no court has ruled on it or if
courts have conflicted in their interpretations? Wilson provided
support for this argument by stating, "If judges . . . disagree on a
constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages
for picking the losing side of the controversy."99 Pearson also provided
strong support for this position by finding a lack of clarity based on
three out-of-circuit federal rulings and two state supreme court
rulings suggesting that "consent-once-removed" is constitutional.100
This argument is susceptible to a number of criticisms,
however. First, it appears to assume that officials actually know the
court pronouncements that purportedly guide them. In the case of
police officers, at least, this is often a dubious proposition.101 Second,
the reasoning that the Court articulated in Wilson suggests that
government officials are disinterested in the outcome of the legal
authority." &e Owens v. Lott, 372 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603, 617 (1999)).
97. Compare Reuland v. Hynes, 460 F.3d 409, 420 (2d Cir. 2006) (requiring that the
Supreme Court or Second Circuit have recognized the right for it to be found clearly established),
with Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that the decisions of other circuits
may be considered to clearly establish a right if they "clearly foreshadow a particular ruling on
the issue").
98. See Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that the court looks
to the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, and the highest court of the state in which the claim
arose to determine if the right is clearly established).
99. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 618.
100. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009).
101. See William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L REFORM
311, 332-45 (1991) (studying police knowledge of the law of search and seizure and finding that
well-trained officers were mistaken about the law approximately thirty percent of the time);
Albert T. Quick, Attitudinal Aspects of Police Compliance with Procedural Due Process, 6 AM. J.
CRIM. L 25, 26 (1978) ("[The police officer's] perception of himself as a crime-fighting craftsman
is outwardly manifested by a general hostility toward concepts of procedural due process and




battle at issue; they merely "pick[] side[s]. '"102 But the official will
generally "pick" the side that allows him to do his job most effectively,
and this will tend to be the rule that approves a practice of
questionable constitutional pedigree. Qualified immunity as Wilson
envisions it essentially allows government officials to play with house
money-they can err on the side of questionable practice without
paying the price later. Of course, the point of the doctrine, at least
partially, is to protect officials from the disorganized state of the law.
But there must be some cutoff point at which a judicial opinion or
series of judicial opinions is no longer considered to muddy the
constitutional waters. Where two reasonable interpretations of a right
exist, officials should be required to "pick" the one most protective of
rights. Finally, if a court requires only a few decisions to find that a
right is unclear, defendants will be able to dismiss suits with greater
frequency. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has expressed
concern that plaintiffs can introduce frivolous lawsuits simply by
alleging violation of a general right. The Court should also be
concerned that defendants are able to dismiss suits simply by pointing
to a handful of nonbinding cases to justify their constitutional theory.
The Court recently addressed this last critique in Safford
United School District No. 1 v. Redding.l03 The case involved school
administrators who asserted qualified immunity against a student's
claim that a strip search violated her Fourth Amendment rights. 10 4
The Court called attention to the "outrageous conduct" principle:
Because flagrant violations are rare, they are rarely condemned in
judicial precedent. Their clear unconstitutionality is thus allowed to
speak for itself.10 5 The Court also downplayed the extent to which
conflicting opinions threaten the clarity of the law.10 6 Finally, it stated
that lower court disagreement is irrelevant if the Supreme Court has
spoken clearly.10 7 However, none of these concerns worked to defeat
qualified immunity in Safford, where two circuit courts had previously
interpreted Fourth Amendment law to permit strip searches of
102. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 618.
103. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
104. Id. at 2638.
105. Id. at 2643 (citing K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.)).
106. Id. at 2644 ("We would not suggest that entitlement to qualified immunity is the
guaranteed product of disuniform views of the law in the other federal, or state, courts.").
107. Id. ("[T]he fact that a single judge, or even a group of judges, disagrees about the
contours of a right does not automatically render the law unclear if we have been clear.').
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students.108 In the ultimate analysis, then, Safford's effect on qualified
immunity doctrine is uncertain. Though mere "disuniform views"
between courts are not enough to "guarantee" qualified immunity,
opinions of two circuit courts apparently suffice to do just that. The
spaces in between remain arguable.
D. Saucier and Its Demise
Do courts need to address the two prongs of qualified immunity
in any particular order? 'Yes," said Saucier v. Katz, 0 9 which held that
courts must first consider whether the defendant violated the
plaintiffs constitutional rights. Yet the Court reversed itself only eight
years later in Pearson v. Callahan.110 Pearson responded to much
grumbling about the inefficiency of requiring courts to address
constitutional issues where the fruits of their labor might
subsequently be erased on the "clearly established" inquiry. But it has
also caused its own difficulties, not the least of which is the potential
for stagnation in constitutional law.
The Saucier opinion itself is a puzzling document, mostly
because it offers no convincing rationale for the so-called "rigid order
of battle" that it adopts. The rule of the case is that when faced with a
qualified immunity defense, a court must evaluate whether the
pleadings establish a constitutional violation before addressing
whether that violation is clearly established law."' The Court opined,
without elaboration, that this approach would allow for the
development of constitutional principles, thus providing the basis for
future clearly established rights.112 That Saucier was an excessive-
force case might partly explain the holding. The Court was displeased
that the Ninth Circuit had merged the questions of whether the use of
force was objectively reasonable under substantive constitutional
108. Id. The Court did reach the constitutional question, however, and found that the strip
search violated the student's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. So, while the student was barred
fron receiving damages, her rights were vindicated, and the Court established clear law on the
constitutionality of strip searches. For the importance of deciding the constitutional prong of
qualified immunity even if the plaintiff loses on the "clearly established" prong, see infra Part
I.D.
109. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
110. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
111. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200.
112. Id. at 201.
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law ' 3 and of whether the use of force was objectively reasonable
under qualified immunity analysis.114 The Court stated that a
particular use of force might be "objectively unreasonable" for
constitutional purposes but not for immunity purposes. 115 Requiring
that courts first address the constitutional prong of the qualified
immunity test presumably clarified this distinction. 116
Whatever its initial rationale, the strict inquiry found many
detractors. 117 The Court responded in Pearson by unanimously
reversing the rule and allowing lower courts discretion to address the
qualified immunity prongs in whichever order they please."l 8 The
Court conceded that the Saucier rule may be "especially valuable with
respect to questions that do not frequently arise in cases in which a
qualified immunity defense is unavailable."' 1 9 But it offered a litany of
reasons in favor of reversal. Requiring the constitutional
determination drains judicial resources, especially where it is
apparent that the right was not clearly established. 120 The rule may
lead to poor constitutional decisionmaking by judges who, convinced
that the right is not clearly established, inadequately address the
113. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989), held that use of force must be objectively
unreasonable in order to amount to a Fourth Amendment violation.
114. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 197.
115. Id. at 206 ("[E]ven if a court were to hold that the officer violated the Fourth
Amendment by conducting an unreasonable, warrantless search, Anderson still operates to grant
officers immunity for reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their actions. The same analysis is
applicable in excessive force cases."). To state the Court's reasoning another way, an officer could
make a mistake of fact when assessing the need to use force on an arrestee. If that mistake of
fact were unreasonable, the officer would have violated the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights
under Graham. However, the officer could still gain qualified immunity if he made an additional
reasonable mistake as to the legality of his conduct. The Saucier concurrence objected that the
legal and factual reasonableness standards are essentially the same in excessive-force cases,
where legality is based on the officer's factual assessment of whether force may be used. Id. at
213-14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The concurrence's implication is that a double reasonableness
inquiry is more appropriate in the law of search and seizure-which frequently changes and
catches judges, not to mention police officers, off balance-than in the more stable law of
excessive force. Id. at 214-15.
116. On the other hand, it seems that the particular error that concerned the Court in
Saucier is avoided if the judge keeps in mind the distinction between "substantive"
reasonableness and "qualified immunity' reasonableness, "order of battle" notwithstanding.
117. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2009) ("Lower court judges, who have had
the task of applying the Saucier rule on a regular basis for the last eight years, have not been
reticent in their criticism of Saucier's 'rigid order of battle.' ").
118. Id. at 242.
119. Id. at 236.
120. Id. at 236-37.
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constitutional prong.121 Where defendants assert qualified immunity
at the pleading stage and facts have not yet been fully developed, it is
difficult to make a constitutional decision. 122 The "rigid order of battle"
violates the canon of constitutional avoidance. 123 A defendant who
wins on the clearly established prong but who loses on the
constitutional prong will not be able to appeal that adverse ruling,
because she has "won" the case. 124 And this list of objections is not
exhaustive. The Court attacked the Saucier rule so vigorously that one
wonders why it was ever required in the first place.
Pearson has several potentially deleterious effects. As other
commentators have pointed out, it threatens disuniformity among
circuits that use different tests for determining whether a right is
clear, and this in turn creates uncertainty for litigants. 125 Most
importantly, though, it promises to hinder the development of
constitutional rights by making it that much easier to dismiss cases on
the clearly established prong. 26 Pearson listed formidable objections
to the Saucier rule, but these should not blind courts to the value of
addressing constitutional rights first in appropriate circumstances.
District courts can mitigate some of Pearson's concerns through
their authority to manage trials. Though the Court has stressed that
qualified immunity is to be granted at the earliest stage of the
proceedings, this does not mean that the defendant is automatically
entitled to dismissal after answering the plaintiffs complaint. Where
the court needs further facts to adjudicate the claim, limited discovery
should be required. 127 Whether the other objections are convincing
depends on the circumstances. Pearson's argument about the
conservation of judicial resources appears to be most applicable to
obvious cases-not to the harder claims in real need of legal analysis.
Likewise, a judge who engages in poor constitutional decisionmaking
121. Id. at 239.
122. Id. at 238-39.
123. Id. at 241.
124. Id. at 240.
125. The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 15, at 280-81.
126. At least one quantitative study has found mixed data on lower courts' use of qualified
immunity for the purpose of constitutional avoidance. This study found that post-Pearson, nearly
twenty-five percent of circuit courts dismissing on qualified immunity grounds did so on the
"clearly established" prong, as opposed to just over six percent during the Saucier era. Colin
Rolfs, Comment, Qualified Immunity after Pearson v. Callahan, 59 UCLA L. REV. 468, 491
(2011). However, district courts used the clearly established prong to dismiss in only two percent
of cases post-Pearson, down from just over six percent during Saucier. Id. at 494.
127. See supra note 49 (discussing discovery in qualified immunity cases).
1316 [Vol. 65:4:1295
QUALIFYING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
because he is convinced that a claimed right is unclear is either
dealing with an easy case or is showing inadequate care for his craft.
If the first, Pearson is correct that the "rigid order of battle" is
pointless. If the second, the judge is no more likely to pay sufficient
attention to the clearly established prong-the defect is in the
practitioner rather than the practice. As for the canon of
constitutional avoidance, it would not seem to be implicated where a
constitutional claim is clearly before a court, regardless of whether the
issue is a novel one. 128
Indeed, even after Pearson, courts have continued to address
the constitutional question before finding that a right is not clearly
established. As a result, there are still defendants who are found
guilty of a constitutional violation while winning the case on the
clearly established prong. The Court attempted to deal with this
problem in Camreta v. Green, which held that such defendants may
appeal to the Supreme Court without violating the Article III case or
controversy requirement. 129 Though the Camreta rule promises
breathing space for the development of constitutional law, it is limited
to Supreme Court appeals; the Court declined to hold that an
appellate court may correct the constitutional holding of a district
court where the defendant wins on the clearly established prong. 130 As
the passionate Camreta dissent suggests, the Court still has many
issues to work out in its qualified immunity jurisprudence. 131
128. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) ("[W]e have long recognized that
our regular policy of avoidance sometimes does not fit the qualified immunity situation
because it threatens to leave standards of official conduct permanently in limbo. Consider a
plausible but unsettled constitutional claim asserted against a government official in a suit for
money damages. The court does not resolve the claim because the official has immunity. He thus
persists in the challenged practice; he knows that he can avoid liability in any future damages
action, because the law has still not been clearly established. Another plaintiff brings suit, and
another court both awards immunity and bypasses the claim. And again, and again, and again.
So the moment of decision does not arrive.").
129. Id. at 2028-30.
130. Id. at 2033.
131. See id. at 2044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("It would be preferable at least to explore




III. WEISE V. CASPER AND THE FLAWS OF THE DOCTRINE
A. The Case
On March 21, 2005, Leslie Weise and Alex Young arrived at
Denver's Wings Over the Rockies Museum to hear President George
W. Bush deliver a speech. 132 The speech was an official event funded
by the government. 33 Tickets to the speech were available to the
general public; Weise and Young obtained their tickets from the office
of Congressman Bob Beauprez. 34 Beyond the ticketing requirement,
the White House Advance Office established its own policies as to who
could attend presidential events. 35 One of those policies was to
prevent those who disagreed with the President from attending the
President's official speeches. 136
Weise and Young travelled to the event together in Weise's car,
which displayed a bumper sticker reading "No More Blood For Oil."' 37
Before Weise went through security, Jay Bob Klinkerman, a White
House volunteer, told her that she would have to wait to speak with
the Secret Service before she was allowed to enter. 38 Michael Casper,
another volunteer, arrived shortly thereafter dressed in Secret Service
garb. 39 He said that Weise would be allowed in, but that she would be
"arrested" if she tried any "funny stuff" or if she had any "ill
intentions."' 40 Moments later, Casper spoke with White House
Advance Office employees Steven Atkiss and James O'Keefe, who
instructed Casper to remove Weise and Young from the museum. 14'
The Secret Service later told Weise and Young that they were ejected
because of the bumper sticker on their car.142 Both Weise and Young
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disclaimed intent to cause a disruption; Young said he would have
asked a question if the chance arose. 143
Weise and Young sued Klinkerman, Casper, Atkiss, and
O'Keefe for violating their First Amendment rights. After some
wrangling over whether Klinkerman and Casper, as White House
volunteers rather than government officials, were permitted to assert
qualified immunity in the first place, 144 the plaintiffs conceded that
the pair could assert the defense. 145 The district court subsequently
dismissed Klinkerman and Casper on the basis of qualified
immunity. 146 Framing the issue as a question of whether the President
"had the right, at his own speech, to ensure that only his message was
conveyed," the court held that the defendants did not violate the
plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. 147 Furthermore, the right claimed
had not been clearly established by prior precedent. As the court
reasoned, Weise and Young had cited no case that "defines the
contours of this right as it applies to a situation in which the
President, speaking in a limited private forum or limited nonpublic
forum, excludes persons for the reasons identified in this Order."'148
143. Id. at 1165-66. Young's question may not have been quite as terrible as his companion's
bumper sticker promised it to be. Laura Kalman relates a classic tale about the unpredictable
byproducts of open discourse, revolving around former Chief Justice Earl Warren's visit to the
University of California, San Diego, in 1970:
[A] huge crowd of students, faculty, and San Diegans packed the quadrangle of John
Muir College to hear Warren's talk. As he rose to speak, several students unfurled a
large banner from a nearby balcony. A hush fell over the throng, most of whom expected
the worst in student graffiti, perhaps "F-k the Chief Justice." [UCSD's] campus and
hundreds of others across the nation had been rocked by student strikes in April when
President Nixon launched the invasion of Cambodia. At Kent State and Jackson State,
national guardsmen and state troopers had gunned down protesters. Earl Warren,
former Chief Justice of the United States, represented the Establishment. But instead of
an expletive, the banner read, "Right on, Big Earl!" The crowd roared its approval.
Warren flashed a broad grin and proceeded to deliver a scathing attack on those who
believed the country could have law and order without social justice.
LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 57 (1996) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Michael Parrish, Earl Warren and the American Judicial Tradition, 1982 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 1179, 1179).
144. See Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 2007) (discussing district court
proceedings on whether defendants could claim qualified immunity).
145. Weise v. Casper, No. 05-cv-02355-WYD-CBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90211, at *4 (D.
Colo. Nov. 6, 2008).
146. Id. at *23.
147. Id. at *22.
148. Id. at *22-23
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By a 2-1 vote, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's
decision. 149 Freed from the "rigid order of battle" by Pearson, it elected
to first consider the clarity prong of the qualified immunity test.150
Noting that the President gave his speech on "private property," the
court found that the plaintiffs alleged no clearly established "doctrine
that prohibits the government from excluding them from an official
speech ... on the basis of their viewpoint."'151 The government did not
suppress the plaintiffs' views or "prosecute" them for their speech. 152
Moreover, the plaintiffs did not identify cases suggesting that
attendance at a speech was itself protected speech.153
The court suggested a fatal flaw in the pleading: the issue
"should have been structured as a First Amendment retaliation
case."' 5 4 The court found that the manner in which Weise and Young
actually presented the issue-by asking whether the "President has a
right to exclude those who disagree with his policies and whether it is
clearly established that individuals have a right to be free of viewpoint
discrimination"-was problematic in two ways. 155 First, it introduced
the question of whether the President, as a speaker, has a right to
determine who participates in his speech. 156 The most relevant case to
this question was Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville,157 a Sixth Circuit
case that found the Bush-Quayle campaign committee could eject an
attendee wearing a Clinton-Gore button.158 This precedent supported
the argument that the plaintiffs had alleged no clearly established
right. 159
Second, the allegation that the defendants discriminated based
on viewpoint was too general to sustain a qualified immunity
149. Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2010).
150. Id. at 1167.
151. Id. at 1168. The court listed the following sources that might establish this doctrine:
"[A] Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of
authority from other courts." Id. at 1167.
152. Id. at 1168.
153. Id. at 1169. The court contrasted cases in which the government discriminated against
"protected speech." Id Because the plaintiffs' mere attendance was not such "Protected speech,"
ejecting them could not have been a First Amendment violation. Id.
154. Id. at 1168 n.1.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 99 F.3d 194 (6th Cir. 1996).




challenge. 160 Citing Brosseau for the proposition that plaintiffs must
allege more than a violation of a general right, the court reasoned that
a "First Amendment claim must be stated somewhere within the free
speech jurisprudence." 161 This Weise and Young had failed to do.162
Finally, the Court found that this was not one of those "obvious
situations" where more general authority informs the defendant that
his action violates a right. 163
Judge Holloway dissented. After opening with the sentiment
that "[i]t is simply astounding that any member of the executive
branch could have believed that our Constitution justified this
egregious violation of Plaintiffs' rights,"'1 4 the dissent proceeded to
address the substantive constitutional issue. 165 Adherence to the
Saucier approach was necessary for two reasons. First, the district
court decided the case when Saucier was still in force; it was
important to subject Saucier's mandatory constitutional finding to
review. 166 Second, this was one of those "questions that do not
frequently arise in cases in which a qualified immunity defense is
unavailable." 167 As Pearson suggested, it was useful to apply the "rigid
order of battle" to such cases. 168
On the constitutional question, the dissent objected that
Sistrunk was totally inapposite. That case dealt with an event
sponsored by a private campaign committee; this one dealt with a
taxpayer-sponsored event.169 Moreover, the majority misconceived the
theory of the plaintiffs' case: the question was not whether they tried
to take part in the President's speech or whether they tried to disrupt
the speech, but whether the government impermissibly ejected them
because of their outside, nondisruptive, protected expression.170 The
plaintiffs did not allege a desire to participate in the President's
160. Id. at 1168 n.1.
161. Id. at 1168.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1170.
164. Id. at 1171 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1172.
166. Id. at 1173.
167. Id. at 1172.
168. See supra text accompanying note 119.
169. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1173 (Holloway, J., dissenting). The dissent also pointed out that the
record did not support a finding either way as to whether the Wings Over the Rockies Museum
was a private venue. Id. at 1172 n.2.
170. Id. at 1176-77.
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speech, and it was absurd to assume that attendance at a speech was
tantamount to participation in that speech. 171 For the dissent, the
constitutional violation was obvious: the President cannot exclude
individuals solely because their viewpoint conflicts with his own. 172
Citing Hope, the dissent concluded that, as a general proposition, the
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination was sufficiently well
established to defeat the qualified immunity defense. 173
By a 5-5 vote, the Tenth Circuit refused to review the case en
banc.174 In October 2010, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to
Weise and Young.175 Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented from
the denial. Citing Judge Holloway's dissent with approval, they stated
that "solidly established law may apply with obvious clarity even to
conduct startling in its novelty."'176 They also rejected the majority's
equivalence of attendance at a speech with participation in that
speech-instead, they believed the claim was properly construed as a
retaliation argument.177 They concluded by expressing hope that the
case would come before the Court in the future: "Suits against the
officials responsible for Weise's and Young's ouster remain pending
and may offer this Court an opportunity to take up the issue avoided
today."178
That hope will not be realized. In June 2011, the Tenth Circuit
upheld the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against
Steven Atkiss and Joe O'Keefe, the White House Advance Office
employees who ordered their removal from President Bush's speech.' 79
171. Id. at 1175-76 ("It simply makes no sense to suppose that the mere presence in the
audience of persons who might have some disagreement with the President on some issues would
have any effect on the President's message.').
172. Id. at 1175 ("Because the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination is so well established,
Defendants violated Plaintiffs' established rights by excluding them from the President's speech
solely on the basis of the protected message of the bumper sticker.').
173. Id. at 1178.
174. Brief for Appellants at 8, Weise v. Casper, 424 F. App'x 799 (10th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-
1438).
175. Weise v. Casper, 131 S. Ct. 7 (2010).
176. Id. at 7.
177. Id. at 8 (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)).
178. Id.
179. Weise, 424 F. App'x 799, 800 (10th Cir. 2011). The technical ground for dismissal was
judicial estoppel. This situation arose from a somewhat complicated procedural posture. The
district court originally granted qualified immunity to only defendants Casper and Klinkerman.
Plaintiffs asked the district court to certify final judgment as to these defendants under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) so an immediate appeal could be taken. The plaintiffs' motion
stipulated that they would accept the Tenth Circuit's ruling as to the remaining defendants if it
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The next month, the District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed a related suit against two former directors of the White
House Advance Office.180 As of this writing, Weise and Young have no
pending claims arising from the Denver incident.
B. The Controversy
Weise and Young became minor celebrities after their
expulsion, a consequence of the media uproar that ensued.181 The
incident appears to have offended a layman's instinct that such
practices are a clear violation of First Amendment rights. But the
legal system did not actualize that instinct. Rather than addressing
the merits of the First Amendment claim, courts hearing Weise and
Young's case engaged a broader controversy, one that is a focal
concern of qualified immunity in our jurisprudence: How difficult
should it be to obtain judgment on the merits in lawsuits for violations
of constitutional rights?
Harlow's now-formulaic articulation-that a government
official is immune unless he has violated a clearly established right of
which a reasonable person would have known-is the doctrinal tool
with which courts seek to answer that question. That tool has little
utility, however, unless we sufficiently define what it means to be
"clearly established." In Part II.C, I addressed ways in which courts
have sought to determine whether a right is "clearly established." The
dominant method is simply to count-are there enough decisions to
tell an official that his action is unconstitutional? Put another way,
does a particular legal premise already exist, or would finding liability
in a given circumstance create new precedent?
These are wrongheaded questions, for they equate doctrine
with law. Law is more than a series of doctrines applied to fact. At a
fundamental level, law is a set of general principles given shape
through doctrine. Doctrine serves law, not vice versa. By defining
affirmed the district court. Id at 800-01. Because the Tenth Circuit affirmed, the plaintiffs'
stipulation in the 54(b) motion precluded them from pursuing additional claims against Atkiss
and O'Keefe. Id at 802-03.
180. Weise v. Jenkins, No. 07-1157 (CKK), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75031, at *2-3 (D.D.C.
July 13, 2011). Specifically, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim that the
defendants' policy for attendance at presidential events caused their ejection from the speech. Id.
at *31.
181. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Denver Three Gain Support in Quest, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2005, at All (reporting on the incident); Jim VandeHei, Three Were Told to Leave Bush Town
Meeting, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2005, at A04 (same).
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"clearly established" merely by asking whether a court has previously
articulated an argued-for doctrine, the contemporary approach to
qualified immunity threatens to deaden our constitutional law rather
than honor its motivating principles.
How do we determine what those principles are? In the context
of substantive First Amendment law, Professor Robert Post has
argued that the Constitution does not protect speech qua speech;
rather, it requires judges to assess social context to determine if
speech should be protected in a given case. 8 2 This point would seem to
be equally true of other constitutional rights. 8 3 Though they may be
stated abstractly, principles of constitutional law often obtain
meaning through an examination of specific facts.'84 If that is so, a
procedural requirement blocking a hearing on the merits unless a
plaintiff claims more than "broad, general propositions of law"'18 5
leaves our law in a state of limbo. That a plaintiff articulates a
constitutional principle abstractly should not in itself prevent a court
from giving the principle more concrete form.
Of course, development of constitutional law and remedying
constitutional wrongs are not absolute values. Courts must weigh
these interests against the need of government officials to exercise
their discretion and to work free from harassing and frivolous
lawsuits. But a more nuanced approach is required to strike the
proper balance. The contemporary qualified immunity doctrine fixates
on the level of generality at which a plaintiff articulates a
constitutional right, but it has failed to reach consensus on when a
pleading is specific enough. It is completely predictable that the
parties will choose the precedent that favors their case, but which
precedent the judge will rely on is much less so. Weise illustrates this
182. See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1272
(1995) ("Were the Constitution to recognize and impose a single general value for speech, it
would in a Procrustean way force the entire spectrum of state regulation of forms of social
interaction into conformity with the particular social practices required by that single value. But
our social life is simply too diverse and rich to be compressed into any such single pattern.').
183. See id. ('Because law is ultimately a form of governance, it does not deal with merely
abstract ideals or principles. Values in the law function instead to signify concrete forms of
actual or potential social life in which what we consider desirable may find its realization.').
184. See John Paul Stevens, Address, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1300
(1993) ("[J]udges have frequently reminded us that their work involves more than the logical
application of general propositions to particular facts; instead, in the crucible of litigation, those
facts often reshape the very propositions that have been applied to them.').
185. Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Brosseau v. Hogan, 543
U.S. 194, 198-99 (2004) (per curiam)).
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phenomenon. The majority, applying the stricter standard of
Brosseau, could locate no specific free speech violation. 8 6 The dissent,
looking at the same filings but applying the looser 'Tair warning"
standard of Hope-a standard the plaintiffs also arguedl87-found that
the defendants' actions violated a general prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination. 88
Moreover, to require the plaintiff to state the constitutional
right with an exacting standard of specificity threatens to impose
overly formalistic requirements on the plaintiffs legal arguments.
Once again, the Weise case illustrates. In their complaint, Weise and
Young used the language of retaliation to describe the facts behind
their action. 8 9 However, at no time do they appear to have specifically
stated the legal premise of their complaint as "retaliation" or to have
alleged the formal elements of a retaliation claim. Rather, they
described the defendants' actions as "viewpoint discrimination."'190 The
court might have read the filings more generously to advance the
argument that government officials act wrongfully when they punish
citizens for their speech on matters of public concern. Such behavior
violates rights whether we call it "viewpoint discrimination" or
"retaliation"-regardless of the plaintiffs specific legal theory, the
general First Amendment landscape is sufficiently clear to reach the
186. Id. at 1167-68.
187. Brief for Appellants at 1, Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1085)
[hereinafter First Appellate Brief] (framing the issue as whether "Casper and Klinkerman
violated the First Amendment Rights of Weise and Young to be free from discrimination based
on their viewpoint').
188. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1177 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
189. See Complaint and Jury Demand at 5, Weise v. Casper, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90211
(D. Colo. Nov. 6, 2008) (No. 05-cv-02355-WYD-CBS) (stating that Casper threatened the
plaintiffs upon their arrival to the speech "solely because of the bumper sticker on Ms. Weise's
car and his perception . ..that Ms. Weise had a viewpoint that was different from the
President's"); id at 7 ("After the event, the Secret Service confirmed to Ms. Weise and Mr. Young
that they were ejected from the event as a result of the bumper sticker on Ms. Weise's vehicle.").
190. See id. at 8 (claiming generally that "Defendants violated Plaintiffs' First and Fourth
Amendment rights by ejecting them from this event on the basis of their viewpoint"); Plaintiffs'
Response to Motions to Dismiss by Defendants Casper and Klinkerman at 10-11, Weise, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90211 (No. 05-cv-02355-WYD-CBS) ('[flt has been clear for decades that the
government cannot exclude individuals on the basis of the content or viewpoint of their
message."); First Appellate Brief, supra note 187, at 1 (framing the issue as whether "Casper and
Klinkerman violated the First Amendment Rights of Weise and Young to be free from
discrimination based on their viewpoinf'). Compare id., with First Amended Complaint at 6,
Howards v. Reichle, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68526 (D. Colo. July 28, 2009) (No. 06-cv-01964-
CMA-CBS) (claiming retaliatory arrest for plaintiff's exercise of free speech rights and stating
with particularity the legal elements of a retaliation claim).
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merits of the claim. The court could then have sorted out the
particulars of the substantive First Amendment doctrine. This result
causes no injustice to the defendants--on the contrary, it is proper
that they endure a trial on the merits, because their alleged behavior
was wrongful regardless of legal spin.191
However, the Weise majority did not emphasize the defendants'
alleged behavior. Instead, it stressed the inadequacy of the plaintiffs'
specific legal arguments. 192 Not only that, but it went beyond the
plaintiffs' claims to embrace the defendants' theory of the case-a
theory that relies on the undeveloped government speech doctrine and
a novel application of the Supreme Court's compelled speech
jurisprudence. 193 In other words, instead of reading the plaintiffs'
claims in their plainest fashion, the Weise majority interjected the
defendants' claims in a way that caused legal confusion. 194 This is a
191. This is indeed how the Weise dissent treated the filings. It drew no rigid distinction
between "retaliation" and "viewpoint discrimination," but nevertheless would have found the
plaintiffs' claims sufficient to reach the merits. See Weise, 593 F.3d at 1178 (Holloway, J.,
dissenting) ("It has been ... well established for years that taking action against a person for
exercise of protected rights is prohibited in most circumstances.').
192. See Weise, 593 F.3d at 1168 ("Plaintiffs simply have not identified any First Amendment
doctrine that prohibits the government from excluding them from an official speech on private
property on the basis of their viewpoint.').
193. The Weise majority accepted the notion that the critical question in the case was
whether the President has the right to secure the integrity of his own communication by
excluding those who disagree with his viewpoint. See Weise, 593 F.3d at 1168 n.1 ("[T1he issue on
appeal as framed by the Plaintiffs is whether the President has a right to exclude from his
appearances those who disagree with his policies and whether it is clearly established that
individuals have a right to be free from viewpoint discrimination. Aside from the law on
viewpoint discrimination, framing the issue in this manner implicates the intersection of the
President's rights as a speaker under the government speech doctrine, his rights to expressive
association, and the nature of the forum." (citations omitted)). Though this is not the place for a
criticism of the defendants' government speech argument, a recent'student comment explains
why the theory was inapplicable in Weise. Jacqueline Blaesi-Freed, Comment, From Shield to
Suit of Armor: Qualified Immunity and a Narrowing of Constitutional Rights in the Tenth
Circuit, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 203, 223-25 (2010). The Weise defendants conflated their government
speech argument with a compelled speech argument derived from Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), and, less convincingly, Sistrunk v.
City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194 (6th Cir. 1996). To my mind, Judge Holloway's dissent is a
convincing explanation of a point that already seems perfectly plain: the compelled speech
doctrine is not implicated by the attendance of a silent audience member who has left her
contrary views at the door (or in the parking lot, as it were). See Weise, 593 F.3d at 1173-74
(Holloway, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the plaintiffs did not attempt to express any opinion
while listening to the President's speech).
194. Judge Holloway agreed with this assessment. See Weise, 593 F.3d at 1173 (Holloway, J.,
dissenting) ('[Tihe district court's analysis was based on a patently erroneous reading of the
Complaint: Plaintiffs' claim is surely not based on denial of the opportunity to participate in the
President's speech.").
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highly problematic approach. Qualified immunity is only meant to
spare officials the burden of trial where they could not have known
that their actions were wrongful. It is not meant to allow defendants
to beg out of trial by creating novel legal arguments. It is appropriate,
of course, for defendants to put forth such arguments; but the proper
time for courts to address them is at a hearing on the merits.
Whether a court reaches the merits of a claim should not
depend on whether its judges wake up in a Hope mood or a Brosseau
mood. Nor should plaintiffs be held to some sort of heightened
pleading standard in order to establish the clarity of a right. And a
motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity should not be an
opportunity for defendants to sow legal confusion and end the suit by
making novel legal claims. How can the Court tailor qualified
immunity to avoid dismissal of seemingly blatant violations while at
the same time maintaining protections for government officials who
truly do need discretion in legally nebulous situations? The following
Part proposes a few solutions.
IV. QUALIFYING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The Court should reevaluate its qualified immunity doctrine,
both to deter and to remedy obvious constitutional infractions such as
those in Weise and to clarify some of the doctrine's uncertainties. In
light of the Weise case and the discussion and analysis in Part II of
this Note, I propose four alterations to qualified immunity doctrine.
First, courts should acknowledge that Saucier often maintains its
usefulness, particularly in First Amendment cases. Second, the
Supreme Court should disentangle the relationship between Hope and
Brosseau. Third, the Supreme Court should reconsider its usual
refusal to tailor qualified immunity questions to particular actors and
particular rights. And fourth, the Supreme Court should tackle the
issue of how to show in litigation that a right is clearly established,
either by implementing a burden-shifting scheme or by requiring
defendants ex ante to err on the side of constitutional behavior where
there is uncertainty among courts over the constitutionality of a
particular practice.
A. A Modified Return to the "Rigid Order of Battle"
Though qualified immunity only applies in a suit against
individual officials for damages, monetary recovery may not be the
plaintiffs primary concern. Whether it is or is not depends on the
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circumstances, of course. Recovery for certain excessive-force claims is
likely to be considerable. 195 On the other hand, damages to
compensate for an injury such as Weise's and Young's-the inability to
attend a presidential speech and the embarrassment of being ejected
from the venue-are not really quantifiable, and wouldn't be worth
much if they were. 196 The real victory for such plaintiffs is the
vindication of their constitutional rights by a court of law. This is one
reason why it is important to address the constitutional issue in suits
where defendants claim qualified immunity.
Of course, considering the vehemence with which the Court
rejected the rule of Saucier, it is safe to say that there will be no
reversion to the "rigid order of battle" in the near future. However,
courts retain discretion to order the test as they see fit. And, as the
Court noted in Pearson, the strict inquiry may be appropriate where
the constitutional issue tends to be tested only when a qualified
immunity defense is available. 197 Judge Holloway emphasized that
Weise was just such a case. 198 What other defendants could have
redressed Weise's and Young's injuries? This concern is especially
acute if we assume that courts will take advantage of their new
195. This is a point that certainly interests the government, which often must pay individual
claims. The availability of indemnification for individual officials appears to be an understudied
element in scholarship on qualified immunity. See Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity:
Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 581, 586 & n.12 (noting variance in state indemnity
schemes and listing several studies on the issue). As Professor Armacost suggests, a major
rationale for qualified immunity--to prevent overdeterrence of useful official action-becomes
much less convincing if the government ultimately pays claims. Id. at 587. Though qualified
immunity today purports to shield officials from the risk of reasonable violations, this has not
always been the case. See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private
Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L REV.
1862, 1870 (2010) ("Today, courts view the qualified immunity doctrine as one that requires
them to strike the proper balance between the interests of the victims and the interests of
government actors. Too much immunity may leave victims uncompensated and fail to assure
proper respect for the law;, too little may chill government officials in the zealous discharge of
their appointed duties. Antebellum courts did not attempt to strike this delicate balance; instead,
they simply addressed the issue of legality and left Congress in charge of calibrating the
incentives of government officials. Congress offered government employees a mix of salary, fees,
and forfeitures to ward off bribery and ensure zealous enforcement; Congress provided further
incentives by indemnifying from any liability only those government officials who acted in good
faith. But Congress might also refuse to indemnify, thus leaving the loss on the official who acted
without just cause.").
196. Although there seems to be some money in such a suit: two other plaintiffs in the Weise
case settled with the government for $80,000. See Weise v. Jenkins, No. 07-1157 (CKK), 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75031, at *16 n.5 (D.D.C. July 13, 2011) (describing settlement).
197. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
198. Weise, 593 F.3d at 1172 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
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discretion under Pearson to more frequently dismiss cases on lack-of-
clarity grounds. 199
It is difficult to establish a general principle for when courts
should address the constitutional issue first. For example, requiring
the rigid order in every First Amendment case would transgress the
concerns the Court expressed in Pearson-even though there may be
plausible responses to those concerns. 200 And in many cases, the
plaintiff will be able to sue a municipality, school district, or other
government body that created a policy causing violation of a First
Amendment right. These lawsuits may vindicate the right even if an
individual official is dismissed from the suit.
In cases where qualified immunity is available, courts should
instead explicitly address the very concern the Court raised in
Pearson: Will failure to consider the constitutional issue leave the
plaintiff without another opportunity to air his grievance? 201 If so, the
rule of Saucier should apply. If not, a court may apply the two prongs
of the qualified immunity test as it sees fit. This would give courts a
sort of dual discretion. First, a court would have discretion to
determine whether the suit is susceptible to filing against
institutional defendants not subject to qualified immunity. If there is
such an institutional defendant, the court will have additional
discretion over application of the test. This scheme recognizes that it
is well within a court's expertise to make a judgment about possible
ways to structure a suit.20 2
199. This assumption may or may not be sound. See supra note 126 (discussing study of how
courts have ordered the qualified immunity inquiry after Pearson).
200. See supra Part II.D.
201. By this I mean that a court should ask whether the claim at issue is of the type that will
generally arise only where qualified immunity is available. I am not referring to whether the
plaintiff should bring his claim in state or federal court. Qualified immunity is a federal defense
that applies in state court, but different appellate rules may apply depending on where the
plaintiff files the claim. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 915-16 (1997) (holding that state
law finality doctrine applies for the purposes of immediately appealing a denial of qualified
immunity in state court).
202. The reader will note that this approach primarily advances the interest of law
development rather than that of vindication of individual rights. If the claim is in fact of the sort
that may be heard in other circumstances, the law presumably will be articulated in those
circumstances. But various procedural bars may block an individual plaintiff from pursuing her
particular claim if the suit is defectively structured. If, for example, she sues only an individual
official and is dismissed for qualified immunity, she may be estopped from subsequently suing a
municipality that she could have included in the original suit.
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B. Clarifying the Breadth of the Right
It is difficult to imagine rules more at odds with one another
than those established in Hope and Brosseau. The Court should clarify
this uncertainty in favor of the Hope rule that officials will have no
qualified immunity if there is "fair warning" of the unconstitutionality
of their behavior. Of course, the Court has stated time and again that
the purpose of qualified immunity is to dismiss suits as soon as
possible-a goal clearly at odds with the more lenient Hope test. But
this goal works inequities when the violation is as blatant as that in
Weise. Though the Court has repeatedly stated that obvious violations
do not require fact-specific similarities to prior cases in order to be
clear, the outcome of Weise suggests that the "obvious" violation test is
too arbitrary to be useful.
Requiring the more general "fair warning" inquiry, rather than
the fact-specific inquiry of Brosseau, is an appropriate way to correct
the bias toward defendants in the latter test. First, it prevents a
defendant from successfully dismissing a suit by alleging an extremely
specific factual situation that a court is not likely to have addressed
previously. Second, it avoids the problem of forcing judges to make
factual determinations that are more appropriate for a jury. Finally, it
will encourage officials to be more cognizant of the constitutional
rights of the citizens they serve. Under the Brosseau test, a defendant
can essentially claim ignorance of the law, even if he in fact had a
strong suspicion that what he was doing was unconstitutional. A
broader test prevents officials from squirming out of their duties so
easily. The current Court might argue that this rule would penalize
officials for their innocent mistakes. However, the skeptic would
respond that the rule ensures that officials avoid those mistakes in the
first place by taking a closer account of what the Constitution permits.
Moreover, nothing in the "fair warning" test exposes officials to
liability when the law is truly undeveloped.
C. Different Standards for Different Actors and Rights
In its original guise, qualified immunity doctrine exhibited a
clear proportionality principle: the more discretion required of an
official, the more "qualified" immunity will be. 203 It was this principle
203. Se Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) ("[I]n varying scope, a qualified
immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being
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that led the Court to grant absolute immunity to the President in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald,2 4 but to give his aides only qualified immunity in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald. However, with Anderson, the Court rejected this
principle. It is unlikely that the Court will return to a pre-Anderson
world.20 5 However, Weise suggests the potential value of a return to
the proportionality principle.
Anderson might be conceptualized as an opinion that
acknowledges the difficult decisions a police officer must make on a
day-to-day basis. Granted, a police officer does not exercise the
discretion needed by a police chief. Her behavior is guided by a set of
rules, namely those of probable cause and reasonable suspicion.
However, the manner in which those rules apply is not always certain,
and an officer may make mistakes when the rules must be applied in a
rapid fashion. Our legal system should not penalize officers for such
mistakes with cumbersome lawsuits.
Even if this reading of Anderson is correct, the same concerns
do not apply to all lower-level government officials. Then why afford
the same leniency to such officials in qualified immunity analysis?
Weise acutely illustrates the problem. The two defendants in the case
were employees of the White House Advance Office. According to one
official description of the office, it is responsible for the "planning and
preparation that go into supporting the President at events around
the country and world."206 This description suggests that the job of a
White House Advance staffer requires very little discretion; it is
difficult to see how the position requires decisionmaking about who
should and should not attend open presidential events. Contrast the
advance man to the Secret Service agent, whose job undoubtedly
requires the protection of the President. To ensure that this is done
properly, the agent must make split-second decisions based on the
circumstances known to him-tasks similar to those of the police
officer in Anderson. As a result, deference to his decisions may be
dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances
as they reasonably appeared at the time.").
204. See supra note 19.
205. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987) ("[W]e have been unwilling to
complicate qualified immunity analysis by making the scope or extent of immunity turn on the
precise nature of various officials' duties or the precise character of the particular rights alleged
to have been violated.). The concurring Justices in Saucier repeated this sentiment. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 214 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
206. Presidential Department Descriptions, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov
about/internships/departments (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
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appropriate when he claims qualified immunity. This is not to suggest
that, had a Secret Service agent rather than a White House Advance
staffer removed Weise and Young, the agent's action would ultimately
have been entitled to immunity. But, given their differing duties, it is
more appropriate to apply a factual-reasonableness inquiry to the
Secret Service agent than to the advance man.
On a related note, it might be appropriate to conduct different
reasonableness inquiries under different areas of constitutional law.
The Weise majority alluded to (and rejected) this possibility: "[M]erely
stating that the government cannot engage in viewpoint
discrimination is just about as general as stating that the government
cannot engage in unreasonable searches and seizures." 20 7 The court's
point rings false. As a textual matter, the language of the First
Amendment is less equivocal than the Fourth Amendment's vague
"reasonableness" standard. And not only is the prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination a time-honored feature of First Amendment
law, it is also much easier to identify viewpoint discrimination than
behavior that violates Fourth Amendment "reasonableness." Put
another way, what is legally reasonable tends to vary based on the
circumstances, but viewpoint discrimination remains viewpoint
discrimination, even if an official who suppresses speech can offer
some plausible alternative explanation for doing so. Where it is less
difficult for officials to interpret and observe rights, a court faced with
a qualified immunity claim should pay less attention to the factual
circumstances that the defendant faced.
This intuition finds support in the Court's approach to law
development in other situations. In the context of appellate review, for
example, the Court has often used the doctrine of constitutional fact in
First Amendment cases to "review the evidence to make certain that
[constitutional] principles have been constitutionally applied."208 This
is true even though appellate courts typically pay deference to trial
courts' credibility determinations and other findings of fact. The
rationale for the departure is that independent review is required to
207. Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1168 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010).
208. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 508 (1984); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 567 (1995) ("[The reaches of the First
Amendment are ultimately defmed by the facts it is held to embrace, and we must thus decide




ensure protection of First Amendment rights. 20 9 Similar reasoning can
be applied to First Amendment cases in a qualified immunity posture,
where judges must determine whether to exercise their full
lawmaking authority or to defer to the defendant's exercise of
discretion.
Of course, different legal contexts bring with them different
equities. When determining whether to overturn lower court findings
of fact, appellate courts are primarily concerned with the
administrative efficiency of the judicial system and the relative
competence of trial and appellate courts to apply law to fact. In a
qualified immunity posture, a key issue is whether permitting a
lawsuit would deter government officials, typically executive officials,
from using their discretion and performing their jobs properly. But it
is worth remembering that, like refusal to exercise appellate
jurisdiction, refusal to hear a claim on the merits may deny a plaintiff
rights and stagnate the law. Because it shares these concerns with
qualified immunity, the doctrine of constitutional fact can serve as a
useful analogue.210
D. Determining Sources of Law
Because the fact-specific approach of contemporary qualified
immunity doctrine already favors defendants, the Court should not
allow defendants to claim constitutional confusion by pointing to just a
few cases that support their actions. One way to respond to this
concern is to abandon the current rule that the plaintiff must
209. See Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 510-11 ("The requirement of independent appellate review
... reflects a deeply held conviction that judges-and particularly Members of this Court-must
exercise such review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the
Constitution.").
210. Though the constitutional-fact doctrine has a basis in First Amendment law, courts
have not so limited it in recent years. See Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling Constitutional Fact:
De Novo Fact Review in the Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 1427, 1453-56, 1459-62
(2001) (describing how courts have "most consistently applied" constitutional-fact doctrine to
questions of substantive First Amendment law, and commenting on its more recent application
to cases involving procedural rights such as those found in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
Where the Court has found that the "relevant legal principle can be given meaning only through
its application to the circumstances of a case," it has more robustly reviewed the facts below.
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (reviewing the voluntariness of a confession under the
Fifth Amendment); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (reviewing de
novo findings of probable cause and reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment). This




establish the clarity of the right.211 Instead, the Court could adopt a
burden-shifting scheme. If the plaintiff presents at least some
authority suggesting that the right exists, the defendant must present
an equal amount of authority suggesting that it does not. This
approach will ensure protection for defendants from constitutional
claims that they in truth could not have anticipated. At the same time,
it prevents defendants from weaseling out of their obligations by citing
obscure cases to support spurious claims that the existence of a right
was "unclear." Less frequently will defendants be able to kill the suit
by citation to a novel legal theory; and if both parties propose novel
theories, then courts may squarely test them against one another.
This approach also promises to strike a balance when courts opt to
address the clarity issue first. Courts will more frequently get beyond
the "clearly established" prong to reach the merits; defendants will
still be able to obtain dismissal by arguing that their actions were not
in fact a constitutional violation.
A second response--one that focuses on an official's ex ante
behavior rather than ex post applications of qualified immunity
doctrine-is to require officials to err on the side of constitutionality if
there is a legitimate legal dispute about whether a particular practice
is constitutional. If it is true that officials monitor court developments
to determine what they may and may not do, then there is no reason
to dismiss them from lawsuits when they apply novel theories that are
restrictive of constitutional rights. When current legal doctrine does
not anticipate an official's behavior, respect for rights and the need to
clarify the law require that the case be tried. Adoption of such a rule
will present officials with a clear ex ante choice: either remain within
the time-honored bounds of constitutional rights or choose a novel
theory and accept the attendant risk of a lawsuit.
Granted, this option does not strike the balance of a burden-
shifting scheme, and it promises to impose the cost of trial on officials
much more frequently than the current regime. This appears
especially true where new technology is involved. 212 Still, as it exists
211. See Weise v. Casper, No. 05-cv-02355-WYD-CBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90211, at *14-
15 (D. Colo. Nov. 6, 2008) ("Once the defense is raised by a defendant, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to come forward with facts or allegations sufficient to show both that the defendant's
actions violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at
the time of the defendant's unlawful conduct.').
212. Consider Tasers, a relatively new instrument of police force. Courts have recently been
asked to assess not only whether Taser use amounts to constitutionally excessive force, but also
whether constitutional misuse of Tasers is clearly established. In Mattos v. Agarano, for
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today, the qualified immunity inquiry is stacked heavily in favor of the
government. If the doctrine is truly meant to balance competing
values, 213 stern measures may be needed to recalibrate the scales.
V. CONCLUSION
Modern qualified immunity doctrine is flawed. By drawing a
very narrow definition of what it means for constitutional law to be
clearly established, it favors the interests of defendants over those of
plaintiffs and threatens to leave the law in limbo. Some of the Court's
cases are simply contradictory. To resolve one such conflict, the Court
should opt for Hope's "fair warning" standard of objective
reasonableness over Brosseau's fact-intensive approach. This approach
would acknowledge that the sources of our law are not limited to the
previous decisions of federal courts. Of course, federal case law will
remain our primary index of legality. To ensure equitable use of that
case law in litigation, the Court should require defendants to match
plaintiffs' burden to show that a right is clearly established. Where
cases are in equipoise or where there is a legitimate dispute over
general legal principles, it should consider adjusting the imbalance
between defendants and plaintiffs by requiring defendants to err on
the side of constitutionality. Finally, the Court should consider how it
might revive aspects of its past qualified immunity jurisprudence,
including the "rigid order of battle" and inquiries that are tailored to
the discretion of the official or the nature of the right at issue.
example, the Ninth Circuit found that police who Tased a pregnant woman who refused to accept
a traffic citation violated the Fourth Amendment. 661 F.3d 433, 446 (9th Cir. 2011). However,
the court counted no cases on point, and thus found insufficient legal clarity to have guided the
defendants. Id at 448. Under my proposal, the outcome would be different. Because Taser use in
such situations is legally nebulous, officers would simply be required to refrain from it when
arresting someone in circumstances such as these. If the court were to address the clarity prong
first, then it would reach the merits; and if it found the defendant's actions unconstitutional, as
it did in Mattos, the defendant would be liable for damages. At the same time, courts would
swiftly dismiss officers in easier cases, such as where they Tased a suspect charging at them
with a weapon. My scheme essentially reallocates the risk of unconstitutionality-in close cases,
the loss falls on the defendant rather than the plaintiff.
213. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
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Whatever approach the Court takes, Weise v. Casper makes one thing
apparent: reevaluation of qualified immunity is necessary not only to
clarify this confused doctrine, but also to ensure a fuller flourishing of
rights.
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